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Abstract
In state-of-the-art New Keynesian model firms are monopolistically competitive and prices are sticky. How-
ever, the average markup resulting from the monopolistic competition is usually assumed away either by pro-
duction subsidy or by the zero-inflation steady state. Also, in models of an open economy the same level of price
stickiness is assumed for both countries. In this paper I study the optimal rate of inflation in a two country model
keeping the average markup and allowing price stickiness to differ between countries. There are two channels
that govern the optimal rate of inflation. First, with local currencies an inflation tax is partly imposed on the
foreign country, so it is optimal to inflate. Second, the average markup constitutes a cost of holding money so
it is optimal to deflate, to compensate this cost. The paper has four novel findings: 1) in the local currencies
regime the first motive dominates and the optimal inflation is positive. 2) In a monetary union the first motive
is absent and the optimal inflation is negative and below the Friedman rule. 3) A monetary union improves
global welfare even when stickiness is different in two countries. However, when this difference is large, only
one country (the one with higher stickiness) benefits from the integration. 4) A monetary union can be welfare
improving for each of both countries, if a transfer is introduced from the more sticky to the more flexible country
of (depending on the parameters up to) 2% of its GDP.
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1 Introduction
In this paper I ask two half-century-old questions. The first one is about the optimal rate of inflation. In a New
Keynesian literature firms are monopolistically competitive and price stickiness is the main transmission channel
of a monetary policy. An inflation rate affects real variables (consumption, labor supply and output) through both
of these frictions. Therefore both are important to determine the optimal rate of inflation. However, the New
Keynesian literature almost exclusively relies on the assumption of zero steady-state inflation. In this steady-state
the average markup is constant and independent of an inflation rate, therefore one of the frictions is effectively
assumed away. I lift this assumption and look for the optimal steady-state inflation in a simple two-country model
of overlapping generations. The two countries setup allows me to study optimal outcomes under two different
regimes: local currencies and a monetary union1.
In the local currencies economy there are two effects that determine the optimal rate of inflation. One is an
international dimension of an inflation tax (the spillover effect) and the other one is that the average markup
depends on the rate of inflation (the markup effect). The spillover effect works in the following way. Inflation
reduces a return on money holdings. This reduces labor supply. The gain from inflation, increased utility from
leisure, lies entirely within the economy. The cost of inflation, the reduced return from money holdings, is however
spread across the two economies, as foreigners also hold the domestic currency (cash in advance) to buy imports.
This creates an inflationary pressure in an economy with local currency. Like in Cooper and Kempf (2003) the local
monetary authority finds it optimal to manipulate the terms of trade and create excessive inflation.
The markup effect works similarly to the Friedman rule. Friedman (1969) argued that the optimal rate of
inflation should equalize costs and benefits of holding money. The real interest rate is the opportunity cost of
holding money. As long as the real interest rate is positive the optimal rate of inflation should be negative, to
compensate for this cost. In this paper the real interest rate is zero, but the average markup constitutes a real
cost of holding money. The markup effect therefore creates a disinflationary pressure in an economy. For plausible
parameter values the spillover effect dominates the markup effect in the economy with a local currency and optimal
inflation is always positive.
In a monetary union however, the spillover effect is absent. The common monetary authority fully internalizes
international spillovers and incentives to exploit the inflation tax disappear. The common monetary authority only
cares about the average markup. Therefore, in a monetary union optimal inflation is always negative and, when
price stickiness is symmetric in both countries, equal to one minus the average markup, that is below the Friedman
rule. The monetary union setup can also be interpreted as a model of a closed economy. Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2010) provide an excellent review of state-of-the-art literature and some new findings on the optimal rate
1In this paper these settings correspond to other settings often studied in the literature: cooperation vs non-cooperation and flexible
exchange rates vs. fixed exchange rates.
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of inflation. They identify the striking puzzle that available theories consistently imply that the optimal rate of
inflation ranges from the Friedman rule to numbers insignificantly above zero, which is at odds with the empirical
regularity regarding the size of the inflation targets around the world. This paper reinforces this puzzle by showing,
among other things, that in a closed economy (or in a monetary union) with monopolistic competition and sticky
prices the optimal rate of inflation is in fact below the Friedman rule. One of the novel contributions of Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2010) is the proof that in a closed economy with sticky prices and monopolistic competition (and
without a production subsidy 2) the optimal rate of inflation is in fact zero. This result is in stark contrast to
Paustian and Stoltenberg (2008) and Khan et al. (2003), which show that the negative trend inflation according
to the Friedman rule yields higher welfare than the zero-inflation. This is further reinforeced by the fact that the
latter two contributions assume production subsidy, which, if anything, increases the level of steady-state optimal
inflation. The result in my paper is in line with those two contributions. Because I do not assume any production
subsidies, in my model the optimal rate of inflation is in fact below the Friedman rule. Later in the paper I explain
the possible reason of the discrepancy of the mentioned results. All three mentioned papers however, deal with a
closed economy setup. In contrast, this paper assumes two countries setup, which is suitable to study the trade-off
between the average markup and inflation tax channels.
The two countries setup is also suitable to study the second, half-century-old question: are monetary unions
optimal? It may seem that the large existing body of literature has exploited this question in every dimension. In
a classical trade-off first formulated by Friedman (1953) and Mundell (1961), the benefit of a monetary union over
a flexible exchange rates regime is the reduction in transaction costs, while the cost is the inability of a country to
respond to its idiosyncratic shocks. In the Mundellian view the benefits from elimination of a currency conversion
and nominal exchange rate fluctuations would encourage more integration in goods and capital markets. Both the
upside and the downside of a Mundell-Friedman argument has been largely extended and widely studied in theory
and in practice ever since. This paper focuses on the upside of this argument. The common monetary authority
internalizes the interdependence of the two economies, the spillover effect disappears and joint welfare goes up.
Surprisingly however, the role of price stickiness on the optimal design of a monetary union has not yet been
studied in detail. In a New Keynesian literature, where price stickiness is the main transmission channel of a
monetary policy, the same level of stickiness is a common assumption in modes of an open economy3. A notable
exception is Liu and Pappa (2008), who study gains from a monetary policy coordination when sectoral composition
is different in two countries and (among other things) sectors may have different price stickiness. In their paper
gains from coordination are significant and due to a fact, that a single social planner can eliminate terms-of-trade
externality that individual policymakers overlook. In this paper it corresponds to the elimination of the spillover
2Starting with Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) it is common in the DSGE literature to undo the monopolistic competition distortion
by a small production subsidy that renders steady-state efficient.
3See for example Clarida et al. (2001), Clarida et al. (2002), Pappa (2004), citeGM2008.
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effect. Also, as Liu and Pappa (2008) study a policy coordination rather than a monetary union, a single social
planner is able to set subsidies individually for each sector in each country. In this paper a common monetary
authority only sets a common inflation rate. When the assumption of symmetric price stickiness is lifted, gains
from a monetary union are distributed unevenly. The country with more sticky prices benefits more from the
monetary integration than the country with more flexible prices. When the difference is large, only one country
benefits.
With the asymmetric stickiness the optimal choice of inflation in the local currencies regime differs between the
countries. The country with higher price stickiness faces a stronger contraction bias and chooses lower inflation in
equilibrium than the country with more flexible prices. In a monetary union inflation is reduced in both countries,
as the spillover effect is removed. When the difference between the price stickiness between the two economies is
high, a monetary union could in fact reduce welfare in the more flexible economy, as the optimal rate of inflation
in the union is inefficiently low. The country with higher price stickiness reaps all the benefits of integration at
the expense of the more flexible country. From the joint welfare perspective however, a monetary union is always
strictly welfare improving. Therefore joining the union could also be sustained as an optimal choice for the economy
with more flexible prices if coupled with a lump sum transfer from the economy with more sticky prices, who is a
net beneficiary of an integration. The integration with a compensating transfer is therefore a Pareto improvement
upon the local currencies regime. For plausible parameter values the size of this transfer is never greater than 2%
of output of the contributor country.
In this paper high inflation in the local currencies regime can be viewed as an example of a free-rider problem
as in Cooper and Kempf (2003), where inflation arises as a suboptimal equilibrium solution to the game between
two monetary authorities and not between a central bank and private agents, as in Alesina and Barro (2002). In
this paper monetary authorities, both in the local currencies and in the monetary union regime do not have any
commitment problem. Creating a monetary union enables the single monetary authority to overcome this free-riding
problem and reduces inflation to the welfare-maximizing level. The novelty of this paper is generalizing Cooper and
Kempf (2003) framework by introducing sticky prices.
There is a large body of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics literature that studies the issue of a monetary
cooperation and unions under sticky prices. Pappa (2004) studies the optimal monetary policy arrangements under
cooperation, non-cooperation and union subject to technology shocks. She finds that monetary cooperation is
welfare improving, however, countries are assumed to have same level of price stickiness and the model is evaluated
around the zero steady-state inflation. I generalize her result by showing what happens when the two assumptions
are relaxed.
Finally, I rely on the empirical evidence of price stickiness offered by Dhyne et al. (2005) and Dhyne et al.
(2009) who estimate price change frequencies and offer different indicators on price stickiness measures for the Euro
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area countries. They find that prices change infrequently and that there is substantial degree of heterogeneity in
frequency of price changes across products and countries. Table 1 shows that the differences in the average monthly
frequency of price changes in the Eurozone countries can be as high as double. This is the reason to allow for the
possibility of asymmetric price stickiness in the model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section I derive competitive equilibrium
outcomes of an open economy given inflation rate. Section 3 studies the optimal inflation rate in an economy with
local currency. Section 4 studies the optimal inflation rate and welfare gains in a monetary union. Section 5 shows
how the monetary union can be Pareto improving upon the local currencies regime when price stickiness in the two
countries is highly asymmetric. Last section concludes.
Table 1: Monthly frequency of price adjustment (in %) across some Eurozone countries
Country Frequency
Germany 13.5
Spain 13.3
France 20.9
Italy 10.0
Portugal 21.1
Source: Dhyne et al. (2005)
2 The model
The aim of this paper is to study the consequences of a price stickiness on optimal conduct of monetary policy
under local currencies and monetary union regimes. I build a two-country overlapping generations model with
monopolistically competitive firms and nominal rigidity in the form of the staggered price adjustment as in Calvo
(1983). Firms facing dynamic Calvo-type rigidities are optimizing as in Yun (1996), Woodford (2011) and King and
Wolman (2013). Consumers are active in two periods. In first period they work, in second period they consume.
The only mean to transfer labor revenues to the next period is through paper money. This generates money demand
in the model economy. Both countries are populated by continuum of homogeneous agents. Consumers consume
goods manufactured both at Home country and Foreign country. Labor is immobile. At time zero a monetary
authority commits to a stable (time independent) money supply growth rate. Changes in money supply come as
lump sum transfers for an old generation and are perfectly anticipated by a young generation. Two countries can
differ in the level of price stickiness. Throughout the analysis I will denote real variables with lower case letters and
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Table 2: Timing within a period in Home country
Firms Young Old
Signal to update prices Receive money transfer
Set prices Supply labor Demand goods
Produce Get paid in Home currency Exchange currencies for Home and Foreign goods
Exchange currencies
nominal variables with capital letters. Foreign variables are denoted by a ∗ and the derivations for foreign variables
are skipped whenever possible. The timing of events in Home country within one period is presented in Table 2.
Total consumption by Home consumers is an aggregate of consumptions of Home and Foreign goods:
ct = (c
h
t )
θ(cft )
1−θ (2.1)
where θ is a parameter representing home bias in consumption. Both Home and Foreign consumption are aggregates
over differentiated goods produced across firms indexed by z:
cit =
(∫ 1
0
cit(z)
−1
 dz
) 
−1
i = {h, f}
where  ≥ 0 is elasticity of substitution among differentiated goods. In next sections I analyze price setting behavior
of firms and labor supply and consumption decisions of individuals.
2.1 Firms
In each country there is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms producing differentiated goods. Each
firms sells its goods to consumers in both Home and Foreign country. Each firm faces two demand schedules (from
Home and Foreign consumers) given by individuals’ solution to their expenditure minimization problem:
cht (z) =
(
Pt(z)
Pt
)−
cht (2.2)
ch
∗
t (z) =
(
P ∗t (z)
P ∗t
)−
cht
∗
(2.3)
where cht (z) and c
h∗
t (z) are the demands for Home variety z from Home and Foreign consumers. Home demand for
variety z is a function of an aggregate demand cht for Home goods by Home consumers, a relative price of variety z
Pt(z)
Pt
and the elasticity of substitution .
Firms are assumed to be able to change their price only in specific states of nature and must satisfy all demand
at a quoted price. Each period every firm faces probability 1− λ that it will be able to adjust its price:
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Pt(z) =
Pt−1(z) with prob. λP#t (z) with prob. 1− λ
where P#t (z) is an optimal price that a firm sets when it receives the signal to reset. Since there is a chance that a
firm will face the same price for many periods, the pricing problem becomes dynamic. Firms will discount profits
j periods into the future by ∆t,jλ
j , where ∆t,j is a discount factor and λ is the probability of not updating next
period. As money is the only store of value, the proper discount factor in this economy is the reverse of gross
inflation:
∆t,j =
1
(1 + pi)j
.
When updating its price each firm maximizes the discounted sum of future real profits:
max
P#t (z)
Et
∞∑
j=0
∆t,jλ
j
(
P#t (z)yt+j(z)
Pt+j
− Wt+jnt+j(z)
Pt+j
)
(2.4)
subject to (2.2), (2.3), linear production function:
yt(z) = nt(z) (2.5)
and imposing that output equals demand at both country and product level:
yt(z) = c
h
t (z) + c
h∗
t (z) (2.6)
yt = c
h
t + c
h∗
t . (2.7)
From the first order condition each updating firm will choose the same reset price P#t , so that firm index z can
be dropped:
P#t =

− 1
Et
∑∞
j=0 ∆t+jλ
jWt+jP
−1
t+j yt+j
Et
∑∞
j=0 ∆t+jλ
jP −1t+j yt+j
. (2.8)
In a stationary steady state with a constant rate of inflation equation 2.8 reduces to:
P# =

− 1W.
A firm that is able to reset its price optimally in a given period would charge a constant markup over marginal
cost, which I define it as the marginal markup: µ∗t =

−1 . A fact that a firm’s pricing decision is in fact static is
a direct conseqence of the CES preference structure. Each period all producers share the same cost structure and
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face the same, due to CES preferences static demand schedule. Hence, their optimal pricing decision is not only
symmetric but also static4.
In an inflationary equilibrium however, the average markup Pt/Wt is different than the marginal markup, as
prices are sticky. This stochastic price setting specification results in a stationary distribution of firms in terms of
the time since their last price adjustment. The fraction of firms that last adjusted j periods ago is φj = (1− λ)λj .
Thus, aggregate price level evolves according to:
Pt =
 ∞∑
j=0
φj
(
Pt−j#
)1− 11−
or, more simply:
Pt =
(
(1− λ)(P#t )1− + λ(Pt−1)1−
) 1
1−
. (2.9)
I define the average markup µt as aggregate nominal price to nominal wage. I can rewrite average markup as:
µt =
Pt
Wt
=
Pt
P#t
P#t
Wt
(2.10)
where the first expression I define as ”price adjustment gap” and the second expression is given by the marginal
markup. In an inflationary steady-state by evaluating (2.9) in a situation where both Pt and P
#
t grow at the same
rate pi I obtain the formula for price adjustment gap:
Pt
P#t
=
(
1− λ (1 + pi)−1
1− λ
) 1
−1
. (2.11)
Then the average markup is:
µ =

− 1
(
1− λ (1 + pi)−1
1− λ
) 1
−1
. (2.12)
Average markup in this economy is time-independent, goes down with inflation, goes up with price stickiness
when inflation is negative and goes down with price stickiness when inflation is positive. Figure 1 plots how the
average markup changes with inflation and stickiness. For the firms to generate non-negative profits average markup
must be no lesser than one. The necessary and sufficient condition for this is given by 2.13. This condition will
limit the choice of inflation rates studied in the next chapter.
pi ≤ λ 11−
(
1−
(

− 1
)1−
(1− λ)
) 1
−1
− 1 (2.13)
With firms behaving as explained, monetary authority can in principle use inflation to undo the friction caused by
monopolistic competition. With prices sticky enough higher levels of inflation pi result in smaller ’price adjustment
gap’.
4A notable example of departure from CES is Bergin and Feenstra (2000), who show that Calvo rigidity under translog demand
structure implies a price-setting rule that is dynamic and gives weight to prices set by competitors.
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Figure 1: Inflation and average markup at different λ levels
2.2 Households
Households are active in two periods. In first period households supply labor to firms, receive wages and profits and
choose levels of Home and Foreign money holdings. In the second period they consume Home and Foreign goods.
The optimization problem of a representative household in Home country is given by
max
mht ,m
f
t ,nt
Et (log (ct+1)− g (nt)) (2.14)
subject to (2.1) and first and second period budget constraints:
Wtnt + Πt = m
h
t + etm
f
t (2.15)
cht+1 =
mht + τt+1
Pt+1
cft+1 =
mft
P ∗t+1
(2.16)
where mht are Home money holdings, m
f
t are Foreign money holdings, Πt is an average nominal profit of Home
firms, τt+1 is Home lump sum money transfer from the monetary authority, Pt+1 and P
∗
t+1 are aggregate nominal
prices of Home goods and Foreign goods in local currecies and et is the exchange rate. Labor disutility function
g(nt) is assumed to be increasing and convex. Taste preference for home goods θ is assumed to be constant and
same for both countries θ ∈ [0, 1] with θ > 0.5 representing the home bias.
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First order conditions with respect to Home and Foreign money holdings yield the following Euler equation:
1− θ
etm
f
t
=
θ
mht + τ
h
t+1
(2.17)
which implies that future money supply will be held in constant proportions between currencies by the old generation.
This in turn implies, that every period old generation would consume constant fraction of home output. With respect
to labor supply FOC gives:
g′(nt) =
θWt
mht + τ
h
t+1
=
θWt
Pt+1cht+1
(2.18)
2.3 Market clearing
In every period three markets clear in each country: goods market, labor market, money market and one interna-
tional foreign exchange market. Goods market clearing in Home country is given by (2.7). Labor market clears:
nt =
∫ 1
0
nt(z)dz. (2.19)
where nt is solution to individuals FOC on labor supply (2.18). Monetary authority supplies money, which is
held by old generation, who spends it on consumption goods and then firms divide it between wages and profits:
Mt = P
h
t (c
h
t + c
h∗
t ) = Wtnt + Πt (2.20)
The evolution of money stocks at Home country is given by
Mt+1 = Mt(1 + σ) (2.21)
where σ is fixed growth rate of home money supply. In next section, it will become decision variable for
monetary authority and is taken by agents as given. Additional money supply finances lump-sum transfers to home
old generation agents:
τt+1 = σMt (2.22)
Exchange market clears:
m∗ht = etm
f
t (2.23)
Finally, the stock of each currency after the exchange market closes is distributed between home and foreign
agents according to:
Mt = m
h
t +m
∗h
t
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2.4 Equilibrium
Given the conditions for optimization by agents and market clearing conditions in two countries I first characterize
optimal steady-state levels of employment and consumption given stable money growth rates. A monetary stationary
rational expectations equilibrium is given by labor supply functions (nt, n
∗
t ), consumption functions (c
h
t , c
f
t , c
∗h
t , c
∗f
t )
and system of price expectations (Pt,P
∗
t , et) such that agents optimize and markets clear. Equations (2.16), (2.17),
(2.20), (2.21) and (2.23) give the following:
mht + τ
h
t+1 = θ(1 + σ)Mt. (2.24)
This together with budget constraint (2.16), goods market clearing (2.7), production function (2.5) and money
market clearing (2.20) imply that consumption in equilibrium is:
cht = θnt (2.25)
cft = (1− θ)n∗t (2.26)
Domestic consumption is therefore always a fixed fraction of domestic output. This stationary property of
consumption combined with money market clearing (2.20) and evolution of money stock implies equilibrium property
of price evolution:
Pt+1
def
= Pt(1 + pi) = Pt(1 + σ) (2.27)
which shows that money is neutral in the long run as pi = σ. Changes is money supply Mt only affect prices Pt.
Last two equations combined with FOC on labor supply (2.18), stationary property of equilibrium and definition
of average markup (2.10) imply stationary level of labor supply. Because of the stationarity time indices can be
dropped:
g′(n¯)n¯ =
1
µ(1 + σ)
(2.28)
where n¯ stands for steady-state equilibrium level of labor supply. In steady-state equilibrium labor and con-
sumption of Home and Foreign goods in both countries and exchange rate are constant and home and foreign
prices grow at the rates σ and σ∗. Equilibrium condition (2.28) reveals interesting properties. The model manifests
long run neutrality of money (as permanent changes in quantity of M only affect prices and not output) but not
superneutrality. There will be real effects of sustained long run inflation stemming from two sources: the average
markup and the inflation tax.
Proposition 1. Inflation has two equilibrium effects on real activity. It increases labor supply and consumption
through a decreased level of the average markup and decreases labor supply and consumption through the inflation
tax.
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Proof. First part of proposition derives from equations (2.10) and (2.11). Second part of proposition follows from
convexity of g(n).
This result differs significantly from Cooper and Kempf (2003), where under flexible prices, positive money
growth rate worked only as an inflation tax, decreasing steady-state optimal labor supply. This proposition shows
that in the sticky prices environment there are two effects of monetary policy working in opposite directions. First,
the inflation tax effect (which works similarly to long term Phillips curve) discourages agents from work, so they
optimally choose lower labor supply level. Second, the average markup effect (which works similarly to short term
Phillips curve) derives from the fact that prices at firm level move infrequently. In non-reseting firms with higher
inflation costs rise faster. They take wages as given and must satisfy all demand at posted price, so they need to
cut their profits, which results in lower average markups and higher average output. In the remainder of the paper,
wherever it is necessary to impose functional form on the labor disutility function I use the following specification:
g(n) =
1
2
n2. (2.29)
From (2.28) and pi = σ optimal labor supply reads:
n¯(σ) =
 
− 1
(
1− λ (1 + σ)−1
1− λ
) 1
−1
(1 + σ)
−
1
2
(2.30)
To calculate the net effect of inflation on labor supply I first evaluate first derivative of 2.30 and later plot how
optimal labor supply reacts to inflation and stickiness in Figure 2.
∂n¯(σ)
∂σ
= −1
2
(

− 1
)− 12
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1 + σ)
− 32︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
1− λ (1 + σ)−1
1− λ
)− 1
2(−1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 since (2.13) holds
(
1− λ (1 + σ)
−1
1− λ (1 + σ)−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≶0
. (2.31)
From (2.31) it follows that the sign of the derivative depends on the sign of the expression in the last parenthesis.
The first effect (inflation tax or long-term Phillips curve) will therefore dominate, so the labor supply will decrease
with inflation, whenever:
σ <
(
1
2λ
) 1
−1
− 1 (2.32)
and the second effect (sticky prices or short-term Phillips curve effect) will dominate, so the labor supply will
increase with inflation, whenever the reverse is true. This can be easily seen in Figure 2. When prices are flexible
λ = 0 condition 2.32 is always met, so optimal labor supply decreases in inflation. When prices are sticky λ > 0 the
above condition is only met for some values of σ. For example, when marginal markup is equal to 1.14 (which gives
 = 8.14) and λ = 0.15 labor supply goes down with inflation up to σ = 0.18. Higher inflation decreases return on
money holdings and this discourages households from supplying labor. Inflation tax effect dominates. Above this
12
Figure 2: Inflation and optimal labor supply at different λ levels
point the average markup effect dominates. Higher inflation reduces average markup in the economy, which in turn
increases return on money. For λ = 0.25 and λ = 0.35 this switch occurs at σ = 0.11 and σ = 0.05.
It can be easily shown, that condition (2.32) is always more restrictive than (2.13) so that both relationships
are possible within the support of σ. This result has profound consequences on optimal money supply rules chosen
by monetary authorities, the topic I turn to next.
3 Optimal Monetary Policy with Local Currencies
In this section I look for the rate of inflation that solves the monetary authority optimization problem. By manipu-
lating the rate of growth of the monetary base local monetary authority chooses a steady state which yields highest
welfare for households and it takes equilibrium outcomes and market clearing conditions as constraints:
V (σ, σ∗) = max
σ
(u (c)− g (n)) (3.1)
subject to optimal consumption decision (2.25) and optimal labor supply decision (2.30). Substituting in we get:
V (σ, σ∗) = max
σ
{θlogθ + θlog(n¯(σ)) + (1− θ) log (1− θ) + (1− θ) log(n¯∗(σ∗))− g(n¯(σ))} . (3.2)
Foreign country monetary authority optimization problem is symmetric. First order condition for the problem
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reads:
θ
n(σ)
n¯′(σ)− g′(n¯(σ))n¯′(σ) = 0. (3.3)
The above condition combined with optimal labor supply condition 2.28 gives the following two roots:
1
µ(σ1)(1 + σ1)
= θ (3.4)
n¯′(σ2) = 0. (3.5)
The problem is highly non-linear therefore I proceed by solving two simplified benchmark cases first. The first
benchmark is the economy with no frictions (perfect competition and flexible prices). The second benchmark is the
economy with only one friction (monopolistic competition). Both benchmarks have closed form solutions. After that
I proceed with the third, full benchmark case, that is the economy with both frictions (monopolistic competition
and sticky prices).
Benchmark 1. Open economy with flexible prices and perfect competition
This economy is analogous to Cooper and Kempf (2003). Prices are flexible (λ = 0) and average and marginal
markups are equal to one (µ = 1).
Proposition 2. In the economy with flexible prices and perfect competition first order condition (3.3) of the
monetary authority optimization problem has only one solution, σ1 in (3.4). Optimal rate of inflation maximizing
households utility is therefore:
σB1 =
1− θ
θ
(3.6)
Proof. See Appendix.
Solution to (3.5) yields σ2 = −1, which is outside of the support for sigma and would bring an immediate
collapse of the economy, with no exchange, no production and no consumption.
With positive rate of inflation monetary authority exploits international spillovers to run inflationary, ’beggar-
thy-neighbor’ policy. Both labor supply and home output is lower than under no inflation. However, fraction of
output is consumed abroad, so inflation tax is partly exercised on foreign individuals. Home individuals can enjoy
more leisure without paying full cost of lost output. It is worthwhile to notice, that if both Home and Foreign
country form monetary union all spillovers are internalized by common monetary authority. There is no possibility
to exercise inflation tax on foreign individuals, as there is no ’neighbor to beggar’. It is equivalent to the situation
of a closed economy, that is θ = 1, so σB1 = 0.
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Table 3: Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
 Elasticity of substitution 8.14
θ Home bias in consumption 0.8
λ Probability that firm will not be able to update (0, 0.32)
Benchmark 2. Open economy with flexible prices and imperfect competition
In this economy the average markup is equal to the marginal markup µ = µ# = −1 and is independent from the
inflation rate. It follows that:
Proposition 3. In the economy with flexible prices and monopolistic competition first order condition (3.3) of the
monetary authority optimization problem has only one solution, σ1 in (3.4). Optimal rate of inflation maximizing
households utility is therefore:
σB2 =
1− µ#θ
µ#θ
(3.7)
Proof. See Appendix.
It is straightforward to notice that in the imperfect competition economy with flexible prices optimal level of
inflation is strictly smaller than in the economy with perfect competition and flexible prices σ¯B2 < σ¯B2. It is due
to the fact that the markup has the same effect on the real economy as inflation tax, it reduces optimal level of
labor supply. As the inflation tax and the markup are substitutes, a lower level of inflation is sufficient to achieve
optimal level of labor supply satisfying g′(n¯)n¯ = θ. It may be the case that for a high markup or high openness the
optimal level of inflation is negative. Similarly to Benchmark 1 case, the second root of the first order condition is
σ¯2 = −1 and is outside of the support for σ.
In this benchmark case a monetary authority in a monetary union would no longer choose zero, but strictly
negative level of inflation σ¯B2 = 1−µ
#
µ#
. The intuition holds the same. A monetary authority wants to undo a
negative effect of markups on optimal labor supply decision, therefore encourages individuals to work more by
imposing a negative inflation tax.
Benchmark 3. Open economy with sticky prices
On top of the effects documented in the Benchmark 2 scenario now inflation also affects the size of the average
markup. As the first order conditions 3.4 and 3.5 do not have analytical solutions I solve the problem numerically.
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I discipline the model with the standard parametrization. The elasticity of substitution  is equal to 8.14, which
results in the marginal markup being equal to 1.14. The second parameter, home bias θ I set equal to 0.8, as
in Pappa (2004). The stickiness parameter λ I vary between 0 and 0.32 to asses how the model diverges from
benchmark cases studied before. The value λ = 0.32 is a yearly equivalent of 0.75 on a quarterly basis, a standard
stickiness value assumed in a quantitative literature.
Figure 3 plots numerical solution of all three benchmark models of the open economy for the chosen parameter
values  and θ and varying the stickiness parameter λ. The optimal level of inflation in Benchmark 3 model is
always lower than in the perfect competition (Benchmark 1) model. Intuition behind this result is similar to the
one explained in Benchmark 2 case. The existence of the average markup in the economy takes away some of the
inflation tax power, as it discourages individuals from supplying labor. Therefore, in the economy with imperfect
competition a monetary authority always chooses the lower level of inflation than in the economy with perfect
competition.
Comparing to Benchmark 2 for low stickiness λ local monetary authority now chooses higher levels of inflation.
Labor supply goes up with stickiness and is convex in inflation (see Figure 2). Therefore, to counter increasing
labor supply resulting from higher stickiness, local monetary authority decides for higher inflation to decrease labor
supply. Consumption rises in stickiness, as average markups are decreasing both in inflation and in stickiness (see
Figure 1).
Optimal inflation goes up with stickiness until λ = 0.15 and the optimal rate of inflation is σ1 = σ2 = 0.18. This
is a point, where labor supply is at its minimum. Beyond this point 3.4 does not have a solution, so σ1 does not
exist and the maximum of the monetary authority’s problem is reached at σ2, that is where n¯
′(σ) = 0. For high
stickiness the optimal rate of inflation is the one, which minimizes labor supply. Labor supply is still increasing in
stickiness, therefore, to counter the effect of increasing stickiness, local monetary authority must now choose the
rate of inflation that minimizes labor supply. As is evident from Figure 2 the minimum labor supply point is a
decreasing function of stickiness.
4 Optimal Monetary Policy in a Monetary Union
The structure of the world economy is the same as before. The only difference is that now the two countries are
subject to central monetary policy conducted by a single monetary authority. The monetary authority problem
is now different, as it choses only one money supply growth rate equal for both economies in order to maximize
the joint welfare of the two. Let σU be the growth rate of the money stock in the monetary union, then the joint
welfare of the two economies V U is:
V U (σU ) = wV (σU , σU ) + (1− w)V ∗(σU , σU ) (4.1)
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Figure 3: Optimal Inflation with Local Currencies
where w is a weight assigned by the single monetary authority to the Home country. The single monetary
authority maximizes (4.1) subject to optimal consumption decisions (2.25), (2.26) and optimal labor supply decision
(2.30) for both Home and Foreign countries. Substituting in we get:
V U
(
σU
)
= max
σU
(
θlogθ + (1− w − θ − 2wθ) log (n¯ (σU))
+ (1− θ) log (1− θ) + (θ + w − 2wθ) log (n¯∗ (σU))
−wg (n¯ (σU))− (1− w) g (n¯∗ (σU))) (4.2)
The first order condition assuming equal weights w = 12 for the problem reads:
1
2
n¯′(σU )
(
1
n¯(σU )
− g′ (n¯(σU )))+ 1
2
n¯∗′(σU )
(
1
n¯∗(σU )
− g′ (n¯∗(σU ))) = 0 (4.3)
As in the previous section, as the problem is highly non-linear, I proceed by solving two simplified benchmark
cases first. The first benchmark is the monetary union economy with no frictions (perfect competition and flexible
prices). The second benchmark is the monetary union economy with only one friction (monopolistic competition).
Both benchmarks have closed form solutions. After that I proceed with the third, full benchmark case, that is
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the monetary union economy with both frictions (monopolistic competition and sticky prices). I split the third
benchmark case into two and study the optimal rate of inflation and the welfare gains when price stickiness is
symmetric and asymmetric in the two countries.
Benchmark 1. Monetary union with flexible prices and perfect competition
With λ = λ∗ = 0 Foreign and Home labor supplies are equal. The first order condition (4.3) boils down to:
n¯′(σU )
(
1
n¯(σU )
− g′ (n¯(σU ))) = 0. (4.4)
The above condition gives the following two roots:
µ(σU1 )(1 + σ
U
1 ) = 1 (4.5)
n¯′(σU2 ) = 0. (4.6)
Proposition 4. In the economy with with flexible prices and perfect competition the optimal rate of inflation in a
monetary union is zero and adopting a common currency is welfare improving from both individual and joint welfare
perspectives.
σB1U = 0 (4.7)
Proof. See Appendix.
The common central bank now fully internalizes the spillovers created by the inflationary tax, namely the loss
of consumption which happens not only in Home country, but also in Foreign country. So the incentives to inflate
are reduced.
In the economy with local currencies there are incentives to distort allocation by imposing inflation tax on the
Foreign country. As Foreign country also deviates from efficient solution, the loss of utility not compensated by
reduced working hours occurs in both countries. The common monetary authority overcomes this externality. The
common central bank internalizes cross-border spillovers from inflation. Without markups it is optimal in a union
to not inflate at all.
Benchmark 2. Monetary union with flexible prices and imperfect competition
With λ = λ∗ = 0 Foreign and Home labor supplies are equal. First order condition (4.3) boils down to (4.4).
Proposition 5. In the economy with with flexible prices and monopolistic competition the optimal rate of inflation
in a monetary union is lower than in the local currency economy and adopting a common currency is welfare
improving from both individual and joint welfare perspectives.
σB2U =
1− µ#
µ#
(4.8)
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Proof. See Appendix.
In the economy with constant markups incentives of a local central bank to inflate are reduced. However, as
markups discourage individuals from working, it is efficient to impose negative inflation rate to undo this distortion.
Another way to see this result is to look directly at the first order condition 4.5. Whenever the markup is higher
than one inflation must be negative for the condition to be met. Right hand side of this first order condition can be
interpreted as the inverse of the gross interest rate (which is 1 in this model). Left hand side is the cost of holding
money. Both the average markup and inflation are costs of holding money. A monetary authority sets negative
inflation rate to compensate for the average markup cost of holding money. In such a union inflation is always lower
than in the economy with local currency.
Benchmark 3a. Monetary union with symmetric sticky prices
With λ = λ∗ > 0 Foreign and Home labor supplies are equal. The first order condition (4.3) boils down to (4.4).
In the monetary union with sticky prices incentives to ’beggar-thy-neighbor’ also vanish, so the optimal level of
inflation in the union is always lower than in the local currency economy. However, now the average markup is
also a function of inflation. The negative level of inflation increases average markups discouraging individuals from
work compared to Benchmark 2.
Proposition 6. In the world economy with symmetric sticky prices and monopolistic competition the optimal rate
of inflation in a monetary union is: a) lower than in the local currency economy, b) lower than in the flexible prices
monetary union c) lower than the Friedman rule, and adopting a common currency is welfare improving from both
individual and joint welfare perspectives.
Proof. The first part of the proof for a) and b) is done numerically and the result is presented in Figure 4, c) follows
from the fact, the the gross interest rate in this economy is one, so the Friedman rule would prescribe zero inflation.
The optimal inflation in this economy is negative, so it is below Friedman rule. For the proof of the second part of
the Proposition see Appendix.
Figure 4 plots numerical solution of the three benchmark models for the chosen parameter values  and θ and
varying the symmetric stickiness parameter λ. As incentives to impose inflation tax are removed in a monetary
union, the optimal level of inflation is always lower than in the local currencies economy in each respective benchmark
and when competition is not perfect it is always negative. To understand this result let us think about a monetary
union with symmetric sticky prices as a big closed economy. This allows us to compare this result with the results
for the closed economy with the same features presented in Chapter 6 of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010). As their
setup is more general, my results should be a special case of theirs. It is not the case however, as their results say,
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Figure 4: Optimal Inflation in the monetary union with symmetric stickiness λ = λ∗
that in a closed economy with monopolistic competition and sticky prices the optimal level of inflation is zero. To
start the discussion let us concentrate on the first order condition 4.5, which is presented below for convenience:
µ(σU )(1 + σU ) = 1
and let’s think about µ, the average markup, as a distortion, and (1 + σU ) as a cost of holding money. In my setup
the monetary authority has only one tool, the rate of growth of the monetary stock (σU ), which in equilibrium is
equal to inflation. If the monetary authority (or any other authority with a causative power) had an additional
instrument that would affect µ and nothing else, it would use this instrument to set µ = 1. Next, as the average
markup distortion had been removed from the economy, the authority would set σ = 0, such that benefits of holding
money (minus the rate of inflation) are equal to costs (net interest rate, which in this setup is equal to 0). In Chapter
6.2 of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) authors consider the economy with production subsidies. These production
subsidies are financed by lump sum taxes and can address the average markup distortion, so constitute a perfect
candidate instrument that fits the above description.
The Benchmark 3a economy can be interpreted as a special case of Chapter 6.3 of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2010) where authors consider the economy without production subsidies. They claim that in this economy the
optimal rate of inflation is also zero. In my Benchmark 3a economy this is not the case, because µ(σU ) is always
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Figure 5: Optimal Inflation in a Union with Asymmetric Stickiness λ 6= λ∗
greater than one. The discrepancy of our results can be traced down to the setup of their proof, where they postulate
that Ramsey planner maximizes agents’ welfare with respect to independently inflation and price dispersion (which
in their notation is p˜t and in my notation would be
µ(σ)
µ#
). In this, their Ramsey planner effectively has access to
an additional tool, that fits the above description. Absent this second tool the optimal rate of inflation would be
strictly negative and below the Friedman rule.
Figure 4 also shows, that the optimal rate of inflation is further decreasing in stickiness. This is because the slope
of the average markup as a function of inflation is increasing in stickiness, as can be seen in Figure 1. Therefore,
when stickiness goes up, the cost of holding money µ(σ) goes up for any given σ. To compensate this additional
cost the monetary authority increases benefits of holding money, by reducing σ.
Benchmark 3b. Monetary union with asymmetric sticky prices
With λ 6= λ∗ Foreign and Home labor supplies are not equal. The first order condition (4.3) does not have a closed-
form solution and the model is solved numerically. The average markup, as in Benchmark 3a is also a function of
inflation. The average markup and Home and Foreign labor supply change in σ, λ and λ∗.
Figure 5 plots numerical solution of the Benchmark 3b economy for the chosen parameter values  and θ and
varying the asymmetric stickiness parameters λ (on the horizontal axis) and λ∗ (four different plots represent four
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Figure 6: Welfare gains and welfare losses from a union with asymmetric price stickiness
different values of λ∗). The optimal rate of inflation in the monetary union economy is decreasing in both Home
and Foreign stickiness, as the intuition from the Benchmark 3a would suggest.
Proposition 7. In the economy with imperfect competition and sticky prices adoption of the common currency is
not always welfare improving.
Proof. Done numerically. For exposition see Figure 6
Let’s focus our attention on a special case where the Home country has flexible prices and the Foreign country
has very sticky prices. The optimal level of inflation in the monetary union economy is negative, and below the
level that would prevail if the Foreign country was symmetric to the Home country. Under such a high level of
deflation the average markup in the Home country increases so much, that the gains from removing inflation tax
inefficiencies are not be sufficient to compensate for this loss. This situation is shown in Figure 6 where the Home
country with low λ experiences a welfare loss after forming a monetary union with the Foreign country that has
high λ. For the cases where stickiness is equal (Benchmark 3a) or relative differences in stickiness are not too large
monetary union is welfare improving from the individual welfare perspective.
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5 Reinstating Optimality
From the Home country’s perspective a monetary union may be welfare reducing if the Foreign country has much
higher price stickiness. The single monetary authority would then be inclined to choose a very low level of inflation.
This low inflation would increase the average markup much more in the Home country than in the Foreign country.
Both countries would enjoy welfare gains stemming from reduction in inflation tax (higher consumption), but the
Home country would suffer from reduced leisure. However:
Proposition 8. A monetary union is always welfare improving from the joint welfare perspective.
Proof. Done numerically. Code available upon request.
Therefore the optimality of a union from the individual Home country’s perspective can be reinstated. This
could be done in many different ways, of which I consider an outright transfer within the union from net beneficiary
(the Foreign country) to the net contributor (the Home country). Formally, I find a proportion γ of the Foreign
country production in the monetary union Benchmark 3b economy n∗(σB3bU ), which has to be transfered to the
Home country to make it at least as well off as in the Benchmark 3b local currency economy:
Vγ(σ
B3bU , σB3bU ) = θlog
(
θn¯(σB3bU )
)
+ (1− θ) log ((1− θ) (1 + γ)n¯∗(σB3bU ))− g(n¯(σB3bU )) ≥ V (σB3, σ∗B3)
(5.1)
where Vγ is the welfare of the Home country in the monetary union with the γ-transfer and V is the welfare of the
Home country in the local currency economy defined in (3.2). Subject to the Foreign country not being worse off
in a the union with the γ-transfer when compared the local currency economy:
V ∗γ (σ
B3bU , σB3bU ) = θlog
(
θ(1− γ)n¯∗(σB3bU ))+ (1− θ) log ((1− θ) n¯(σB3bU ))− g(n¯∗(σB3bU )) ≥ V ∗(σ∗B3, σB3).
(5.2)
I solve 5.1-5.2 numerically assuming that the Foreign country is very rigid (λ∗ = 0.45) and the stickiness in
Home country varies between 0 and 0.45. Figure 7 plots the minimum γ at different levels of λ for which (5.1) holds
with equality. In the most extreme scenario (λ = 0, λ∗ = 0.4) a lump sum transfer to Home country equivalent to
2% of the Foreign country’s production would make the Home country indifferent between keeping local currency
and joining the monetary union. Naturally, as Home stickiness λ goes up, relative differences between the economies
become smaller and required transfer becomes smaller. At λ > 0.27 Home country finds it optimal to join a union
without any transfer.
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Figure 7: Lump sum transfer within a union in % of Foreign GDP
6 Conclusions
Are monetary unions welfare improving? There are three main ideas supporting a positive answer. First, a monetary
union reduces transaction costs. Second, it may help to promote international trade. Third, the common central
bank gains more independence which helps to overcome possible problems with commitment or time-inconsistency.
In this model I refrain from these considerations adding new dimension to existing knowledge. Transaction costs
are assumed to be non-existent, trade does not depend on the structure of the monetary policy and commitment
of any central bank is assumed to always be in place. This paper explores another channel. Because of having a
common central bank, in a monetary union countries can effectively commit to not tax each other with inflation.
In this model monetary union always improves joint welfare.
A new finding of this paper is that, although joint welfare goes up in a monetary union, individual welfare does
not necessarily so. This is because prices are sticky and the degree of price stickiness may vary among the economies.
With asymmetric stickiness the optimal choice of inflation in the local currencies economy differs between countries.
The country with higher price stickiness chooses lower inflation than the country with more flexible prices. In a
monetary union inflation is reduced in both countries, as the inflation tax effect is removed. When the difference
in price stickiness is high, joining a union is welfare improving for the economy with more stickiness and is welfare
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reducing for the economy with less stickiness. Joining a union could be sustained as the optimal choice for the
economy with more flexible prices if coupled with a lump sum transfer from the economy with more sticky prices.
Integration with a compensating transfer is therefore a Pareto improvement upon the local currencies regime.
Another contribution of this paper is a theoretical study of the optimal rate of inflation. I reinforce the puzzle
identified by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2010) that available theories consistently imply that the optimal rate of
inflation in a closed economy ranges from the Friedman rule to numbers insignificantly above zero. In this model
the optimal rate of inflation in a closed economy is in fact below the Friedman rule. When production is done by
monopolistically competitive firms and prices are sticky, the average markup constitutes a cost on holding money.
The only way the monetary authority can compensate for this cost is to set the negative rate of inflation. As the
net interest rate in this model is zero, the optimal rate of inflation is therefore below the Friedman rule.
In the open economy however, this is is not necessarily the case. The equilibrium outcome of the game between
two monetary authorities is to impose impose an inflation tax on each other. As part of home consumption is in
foreign goods, and is not affected by local monetary policy, the loss in consumption is not fully internalized by local
monetary authority. In the open economy the monetary authority faces two effects: the spillover effect, which brings
the optimal inflation up, and the average markup effect, which brings the optimal inflation down. For reasonable
parameter values the first effect is stronger and the optimal rate of inflation is positive.
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A Derivations
2.1 Firms
2.1 Households
Plugging in 2.1 and 2.16 the maximization problem becomes:
max
mht ,m
f
t ,nt
Et
(
θlog
(
mht + τt+1
Pt+1
)
+ (1− θ)log
(
mft
P ∗t+1
)
− g(nt)
)
(A.1)
subject to 2.15. The three first order conditions are:
θ
mht+τt+1
Pt+1
1
Pt+1
− νt = 0 (A.2)
1− θ
mft
P∗t+1
1
P ∗t+1
− νtet = 0 (A.3)
−g′(nt) + νtWt = 0 (A.4)
where νt is a Lagrange multiplier associated with the first period budget constraint 2.15. Combining A.2 with A.3
gives 2.17 and combining A.2 with A.4 gives 2.18.
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B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. Feasible choices for σ are σ ∈ (−1,∞). First I show that σ2 is outside of the support of
σ. From 3.5:
n¯′(σ¯2) = 0. (B.1)
Plugging in λ = 0 to 2.31 we get:
n¯′(σ¯2) =− 1
2
(

− 1
)− 12
(1 + σ2)
− 32
(
1− 0 (1 + σ2)−1
1− 0
)− 1
2(−1)
(
1− 0 (1 + σ2)
−1
1− 0 (1 + σ2)−1
)
= −1
2
(

− 1
)− 12
(1 + σ2)
− 32 = 0
⇒ σ2 = −1 (B.2)
Therefore it must be that σ1 is the optimal inflation rate. Plugging in µ = 1 to 3.4 we get:
1
1 + σ1
= θ
θ + θσ1 = 1
σ1 =
1− θ
θ
(B.3)
QED
Proof of Proposition 3. As λ = 0 it must be that σ2 = −1 as shown in the Proof of Proposition 2. The second
part of the proof is analogous. Plugging in µ = µ# to 3.4 we get:
1
µ#(1 + σ1)
= θ
θµ# + θµ#σ1 = 1
σ1 =
1− µ#θ
µ#θ
(B.4)
QED
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof of the first result, zero inflation in a monetary union, is analogous to the
Proof of Proposition 2. As λ = λ∗ = 0 it must be that σU2 = −1. Therefore it must be that σU1 is the optimal
inflation rate. Plugging in µ = 1 to 4.5 we get::
1
1 + σB1U1
= 1
1 + σB1U1 = 1
σB1U1 = 0 (B.5)
29
Next I prove the second result, the welfare improvement from adoption of a common currency. As countries are
symmetric it is enough to prove the welfare improvement for Home country. Welfare gains from the adoption of a
common currency in this economy (Benchmark 1) are defined as a difference in utility between the monetary union
equilibrium and the local currency equilibrium of each generation in the Home country :
WGB1 = V (σB1U , σB1U )− V (σB1, σ∗B1) (B.6)
where V (.) is defined in 3.2, σB1U = 0 is the optimal rate of inflation in the monetary union economy and σB1 =
σ∗B1 is the optimal rate of inflation in the local currencies economy. Substituting in equilibrium relationships we
get:
WGB1 = θlog(θn¯(σB1U )) + (1− θ) log((1− θ) n¯∗(σB1U ))− g(n¯(σB1U ))
− θlog(θn¯(σB1))− (1− θ) log((1− θ) n¯∗(σB1)) + g(n¯(σB1))
= log(n(0))− log(n(σB1)) + g(n(σB1))− g(n(0)) (B.7)
Proposition 1 established that inflation has two equilibrium effects on labor supply. It increases labor supply through
the markup effect and decreases the labor supply through the inflation tax effect. In the Benchamrk 1 economy prices
are flexible, so the markup effect is shut down and labor supply is decreasing in inflation. The following relations
hold:
0 < σB1
n(0) > n(σB1)
log(n(0)) > log(n(σB1)).
g(n(0)) > g(n(σB1)). (B.8)
Therefore:
WGB1 = log(n(0))− log(n(σB1))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ g(n(σB1))− g(n(0))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(B.9)
To asses the sign of the welfare gains I substitute in the functional form for g(n) assumed in 2.29 and the result
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for n(σ) obtained in 2.30 with λ = 0 and −1 = 1:
WGB1 = log(1) +
1
2
log(1 + σB1) +
1
2
(1 + σB1)−1 − 1
2
(1)−1
=
1
2
(
log(1 + σB1) +
1
1 + σB1
− 1
)
=
1
2
(
log(1 + σB1)− σ
B1
1 + σB1
)
≈ 1
2
(
σB1 − σ
B1
1 + σB1
)
=
1
2
(
(σB1)2
1 + σB1
)
> 0 (B.10)
QED
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of the first result, the optimal rate of inflation in a monetary union, is
analogous to the Proof of Proposition 2. As λ = λ∗ = 0 it must be that σU2 = −1. Therefore it must be that σU1 is
the optimal inflation rate. Plugging in µ = µ# to 4.5 we get::
1
µ#(1 + σB2U )
= 1
1 + σB2U =
1
µ#
σB2U =
1− µ#
µ#
. (B.11)
It is immediate to see, that as θ < 1 it must be that:
1− µ#
µ#
<
1− θµ#
θµ#
⇐⇒ σB2U < σB2 (B.12)
Next I prove the second result, the welfare improvement from adoption of a common currency, following the logic
of the Proof of Proposition 4. Welfare gains from the adoption of a common currency in the Benchmark 2 economy
are:
WGB2 = V (σB2U , σB2U )− V (σB2, σ∗B2)
= θlog(θn¯(σB2U )) + (1− θ) log((1− θ) n¯(σB2U ))− g(n¯(σB2U ))
− θlog(θn¯(σB2))− (1− θ) log((1− θ) n¯∗(σB2)) + g(n¯(σB2))
= log(n(σB2U ))− log(n(σB2)) + g(n(σB2))− g(n(σB2U )) (B.13)
To asses the sign of the welfare gains I substitute in the functional form for g(n) assumed in 2.29 and the result
for n(σ) obtained in 2.30 with λ = 0:
n(σB2U ) = (µ#)−
1
2 (1 + σB2U )−
1
2 (B.14)
n(σB2) = (µ#)−
1
2 (1 + σB2)−
1
2 (B.15)
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WGB2 = −1
2
log(µ#)− 1
2
log(1 + σB2U ) +
1
2
log(µ#) +
1
2
log(1 + σB2)
+
1
2
(µ#)−1(1 + σB2)−1 − 1
2
(µ#)−1(1 + σB2U )−1
=
1
2
{
log(1 + σB2)− log(1 + σB2U ) + 1
µ#(1 + σB2)
− 1
µ#(1 + σB2U )
}
≈ 1
2
{
σB2 − σB2U + 1
µ#(1 + σB2)
− 1
µ#(1 + σB2U )
}
=
1
2
σ
B2 − σB2U + σ
B2U − σB2
µ#(1 + σB2)(1 + σB2U )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1

>
1
2
{
σB2 − σB2U
µ#(1 + σB2)(1 + σB2U )
+
σB2U − σB2
µ#(1 + σB2)(1 + σB2U )
}
= 0
⇐⇒ WGB2 > 0 (B.16)
As countries are symmetric, if adopting a common currency improves welfare of a single country it also improves
joint welfare. QED
Proof of Proposition 6. First, notice that from 2.30 and 2.28:
n(σ) = (µ(σ) (1 + σ))
− 12 (B.17)
next, from 3.4:
µ(σB3)
(
1 + σB3
)
=
1
θ
(B.18)
and from 4.5
µ(σB3aU )
(
1 + σB3aU
)
= 1. (B.19)
Therefore, as λ = λ∗:
n(σB3) = n∗(σB3) = θ
1
2 (B.20)
n(σB3aU ) = n∗(σB3aU ) = 1 (B.21)
Welfare gains from the adoption of a common currency in the Benchmark 3a economy therefore are:
WGB3a = V (σB3aU , σB3aU )− V (σB3, σB3) = log(n(σB3aU ))− log(n(σB3)) + g(n(σB3))− g(n(σB3aU ))
= log(1)− log(θ 12 ) + 1
2
θ − 1
2
=
1
2
(θ − 1− log(θ)) > 1
2
(θ − 1− θ + 1) = 0
⇐⇒ WGB3a > 0 (B.22)
As countries are symmetric, if adopting a common currency improves welfare of a single country it also improves
joint welfare. QED
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